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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(3)(j). This
appeal is from a final judgment in the 4th District Court, State of Utah, Utah County,
Provo Division, by Honorable Judge James R. Taylor. Appellant has not filed any Rule
50(b) or Rule 59 motions. Appellant has filed a motion pursuant to Rule 52(b) on
December 28, 2006.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue 1:
Can a jury demand be considered knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, or mechanically
waved through action of law, when:
the jury demand was properly requested in the initial filing of the complaint;
prior counsel for appellant paid all the fees as requested by the clerk of courts;
prior counsel for appellant informed appellant that jury demand had been properly
made;
court first informed the appellant, now pro se, at the first hearing scheduled on the
matter that the jury fee had not been recorded;
demand for jury was renewed and paid prior to scheduling for trial and 5 months
prior to the trial; and
interlocutory stay and appeal were applied for to challenge the denial of jury trial?

Determinative Statutes:
UT. Rules Civil Procedure, Rule 38. Jury trial of right.
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the constitution or as given
by statute shall be preserved to the parties.
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(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury
by paying the statutory jury fee and serving upon the other parties a demand therefor
in writing at any time after the commencement of the action and not later than 10 days
after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue. Such demand may be
endorsed upon a pleading of the party.
(c) Same: specification of issues. In his demand a party may specify the issues which he
wishes so tried; otherwise he shall be deemed to have demanded trial by jury for all
the issues so triable. If he has demanded trial by jury for only some of the issues, any
other party, within 10 days after service of the demand or such lesser time as the court
may order, may serve a demand for trial by jury of any other or all of the issues of fact
in the action.
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, to serve a demand as required
by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of trial
by jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be withdrawn
without the consent of the parties.
UT. Rules Civil Procedure, Rule 39. Trial by jury or by the court.
(a) By jury. When trial by jury has been demanded as provided in Rule 38, the action
shall be designated upon the register of actions as a jury action. The trial of all issues
so demanded shall be by jury, unless
(a)(1) The parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed with the court or
by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the record, consent to trial by
the court sitting without a jury, or
(a)(2) The court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that a right of trial by jury of
some or all of those issues does not exist, or
(a)(3) Either party to the issue fails to appear at the trial.
(b) By the court. Issues not demanded for trial by jury as provided in Rule 38 shall be
tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury in an
action in which such a demand might have been made of right, the court in its
discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any or all issues.
(c) Advisory jury and trial by consent. In all actions not triable of right by a jury the court
upon motion or of its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or, with
the consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose verdict has the same
effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right.
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UT. Rules Civil Procedure, Rule 6(b)
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the
court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for
cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order
the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period
originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after
the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act
was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action
under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and 60(b), except to the extent and under the
conditions stated in them.
UT. Rules Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b)
b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b)
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.

Determinative Law:
Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 P.3d (2006 UT App 303); James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah
2d 210, 390 P.2d 127, 128 (1944); Hunter v. Michaelis, 114 Utah 242, 198 P.2d 245, 247
(1948). Thompson v. Anderson, 107 Utah 331, 153 P.2d 665 (1944)

Issue 2:
Whether party pro se can be granted trial by jury?
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Determinative Statutes:
UT. Rules Civil Procedure, Rule 39. Trial by jury or by the court.
(text cited above)
Determinative Law:
Orem City v. Bovo, 76 P.3d 1170 (2003 UT App 286)

Issue 3:
Whether one private party can sue another private party for malicious prosecution?
Determinative Statutes:
U.C.A. §78-3-4, Jurisdiction — Appeals.
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not
excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other writs necessary to
carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees.
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of lawyer discipline consistent with the
rules of the Supreme Court.
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters properly filed in the circuit court
prior to M y 1, 1996.
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate trials de novo of the
judgments of the justice court and of the small claims department of the district court.
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the district court are under
Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3.
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review:
(a) agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the requirements of that chapter, in
its review of agency adjudicative proceedings; and
(b) municipal administrative proceedings in accordance with Section 10-3-703.7.
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has subject matter jurisdiction in
class B misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors, infractions, and violations of ordinances
only if:
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction;
(b) the matter was properly filed in the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996;
(c) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the municipality in which the district
courthouse is located and that municipality has not formed a justice court; or
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(d) they are included in an indictment or information covering a single criminal
episode alleging the commission of a felony or a class A misdemeanor.
(9) The district court has jurisdiction of actions under Title 78, Chapter 3h, Child
Protective Orders, if the juvenile court transfers the case to the district court.

U.C.A. 78-33-1. Jurisdiction of district courts — Form — Effect
The district courts within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights,
status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No
action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment
or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and
effect; and such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.

Determinative Law:
KoolvLee, 134 P. 906, (UT 1913)

Issue 4:
Whether a defaulting party can effectually be found to have rebutted a prima facie case
based on a non-defaulting party?
Determinative Statutes:
UT. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55. Default.
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has
failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to
appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party.
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the
amount claimed and costs against the defendant if:
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear ;
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person;
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can be
made certain by computation.
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(b)(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall
apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to
carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of
damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an
investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such
references as it deems necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of
default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in
accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply
whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party
plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a
judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c).
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by default shall
be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the
claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.

Determinative Law:
Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998)
Issue 5:
Ineffective Counsel
Determinative Statutes
U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Utah Const, art. I, § 7.
Determinative Law:
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994)

Issue 6:
Whether a Court's finding of "no cause of action" is sufficient findings of facts and
conclusions of law to specially constitute the grounds of its action.
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Determinative Statutes:
UT. Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon,
and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5 8A; in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings
are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and
conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of
the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court.
The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief
written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules
12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of
judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may
amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new
trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court
without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings
may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in the
district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend
them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce,
findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of
fact:
(c)(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(c)(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(c)(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.

Determinative Law:
Bailey v. Bayles,l& P.3d 1129 (UT App. 2001) ; Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v.
Pine-crest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225 (Utah 1995)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature, Course, and Disposition of these Proceedings
Plaintiff is a Grandparent who had not seen his Grandchildren in more than a year
because his daughter-in-law had fled her marriage taking those children with her and
remaining in hiding under the help of women's protective shelters and family members on
her side of the family. Plaintiff sought Grandparent visitation through the Courts.
Several court dates ensued as a result of Plaintiff s visitation request and during one of
those court sessions the parties were told by the Judge that the visitation for the father and
Grandparents would be unsupervised unless the daughter-in-law could show that the
Grandparents posed some kind of threat. Within the next few days two different police
reports which included written statements from the Defendants alleging various domestic
violence related actions on the part of the Plaintiff were filed with law enforcement.
Plaintiff claimed these were false reports. One report alleged an assault and another
alleged that the Plaintiff was essentially stalking his daughter-in-law. The reports
resulted in only one charge of disorderly conduct filed against the Plaintiff, which was
subsequently dismissed.
Represented by Attorney number 1, Plaintiff filed his original complaint for
various causes of action requesting a "trial by Jury." Fuller v. Myers et al 040401694
and paid all the fees requested by the Clerk.
Attorney number 1 then withdrew from representation. Plaintiff acting pro se
subsequently sent discovery requests to Defendants and months latter appeared
representing himself in a motions hearing trying to compel discovery relating to his

%

completely unanswered requests for discovery

I lie trial Judge at tlu • ^. \ first of si ich

motion hearings then informed Plaintiff that he felt that a pro se plaintiff could not handle
a jury trial and that there was also a question of whether or not the jury fee had been paid.
Judge also suggested that the Plaintiff should obtain counsel. Plaintiff then renewed his
demand for a Jury, paid some more fees, and subsequently hired Attorney number 2.
Plaintiff then filed another renewed request for Jury which was ultimately denied.
Plaintiff then filed his motion for stay and request for interlocutory appeal challenging
the denial. That request was also denied and hi-- ,n rwnvni> ••• »i navin >• un trial were
not heard by the Court of Appeals. A bench trial went forward resulting in a dismissal of
all charges against defendants, but a written order did not follow for several months.
Attorney number 2 then withdrew from representation. Plaintiff then filed his own
version of a written order including findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Judge
ultimately signed the order dismissing the complaint, but crossed out all findings of fact
and conclusions of law except stating "no cause of action." Plaintiff subsequently filed a
Rule 52 motion to amend the order to include findings and later filed a request to submit
for decision on the motion. The Rule 52 motion has still not been addressed by the Trial
Court. Fuller v. Myers et. at 04(MM •/>*a

Relevant Facts
In the trial court in the malicious prosecution case one of the causes of action did
arise on October 7, 2003 diiring a Protective Order Hearing at the Fourth District Juvenile
Court, concerning custody and visitation of minor children. Official Certified Transcript,
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Pg 8, In. 12-20 page 9 In. 18,-20 Case No 430165 Beverly Lowe, Csr/CCT. (attached
Page 1, and Page 8,9)
Plaintiff, alleged in his complaint that Defendants had twice fabricated lies to file
false police reports against the Plaintiff in an attempt to gain advantage in a divorce and
custody matter. In one of the false police reports, Defendants alleged that Plaintiff had
stalked his daughter-in-law. That complaint eventually became listed on the police
records as a "false" police report filed by Mayna Fuller. Case No. 200309721, Provo
Police Department Crime Report (Oct. 29, 2003). The second case resulted from an
alleged incident in the court room where Defendant Krik Myers along with all of Mayna
Fuller's family, the other Defendants in this case, had filed statements with the police
alleging that Plaintiff had somehow attacked and assaulted Krik Myers in the open court
room. Plaintiff disputed their allegations and the actual facts, films, and evidence in the
case all showed that Plaintiff had never touched Krik Myers and Plaintiff prevailed on all
those charges. Order Case #031404758, Fourth District, Provo Department (April 22,
2004); also see Utah County Sheriff Crime Report Case No. 434285, (Oct. 28, 2003).
In the trial court in the malicious prosecution case, the causes of action did arise at
a time during another court's prbceedings in a civil matter concerning custody and
visitation of minor children, however, the record should be clear that the causes of actions
themselves in this case were not a part of the cases being heard by the family court on
that day. Instead these actions (as alleged in the complaint) arose out of actions that
could be considered an intentional and malicious tort in filing of false police reports. A
sort of "defamation" case was considered alleged, but the more accurate title of the claim
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was "malicious prosecution11 .•veruh::; Plaintiff ca!N :* • -Hseh alleged assault and battery
situation, having nothing to do with the family court that day. Plaintiff was seeking
specific money damages at the trial court in this matter.
Plaintiff filed his complaint on May 19, 2004, through the aid of his counsel at
the time. Included in the original complaint was a written demand for trial by jury and
notice was given to opposing counsel. Although Plaintiffs former counsel was paid to
file the claim and pay all the fees with the court, Plaintiff counsel evidently did not pay
enough money for all the possible fees. Hie record .l:n % nut -.now a cover sheet, which
would have been helpful in explaining what fees were actually due at filing.
Plaintiff was unaware that his counsel did not pay the statutory jury fee at the time
of filing, and no notice of that was made to Plaintiff until much later. Counsel for
Plaintiff withdrew very shortly after filing the complaint. Plaintiffs original counsel
never made it known to Plaintiff that the fee for the jury request had not been paid. To the
contrary, Counsel specifically told Plaintiff that all the fees had been paid. Plaintiff then
began representing himself In his malicious prosecution con^bin! and after a some^ h:i»
lengthy discovery process, Plaintiff pro se had filed discovery requests and requests to
compel. Counsels for Defendants had not answered one single request for the discovery
as late as October of 2005. Plaintiff then filed motions for contempt and requested a
scheduling and pretrial conference which was held on the 3rd of October, 2005 wherein
during such conference, the trial court Judge first made Plaintiff aware that the jury fee
had not been paid. Official Certified Transcript, Pg. 38, In. 9, CD#05-44-402, Penny C.
Abbott, Reporter-1 ranscriber.

The Judge told Plaintiff, still Pro se, that he would consider allowing a trial by
Jury, if Plaintiff was going to get himself an attorney and properly argue his case for why
a jury trial was proper and had not been waived. Pg. 37. In. 8, Id.. A minute entry of the
October scheduling conference was entered into the record indicating that Plaintiff had
renewed his request for jury trial.
Another Oral argument was then held on November 23, 2005 wherein the Judge
decided to ignore the jury request that had been made in May 19, 2004 without stating
any reason for not considering it. The Judge instead chose to take the October 11, 2005
renewed jury demand as the one and only Jury demand. Official Certified Transcript, Pg.
7, In. 10-12, CD#05-60-402, Penny C. Abbott, Reporter-Transcriber. The Judge then
went on that if the Plaintiff would obtain counsel, that he would "reconsider" allowing
the jury trial. Pg. 11, ln.22 Id.
Also during the November 23, 2005 hearing, the judge noted that apparently one
Defendant, Krik Myers, had answered the initial complaint and then Attorney Rose
Blakelock accepted the duties of Counsel for representing Defendant Krik Myers (Pg. 14,
In. 8-9 Id.). There is no record that she ever withdrew or substituted counsel, but
Attorney Jube for the other Defendants merely suggested to the Judge that it might have
just been a "typo" and that Attorney Blakelock (not present at this hearing) didn't really
mean to represent Defendant Myers.
A pretrial conference was then held in the court on January, 13, 2006, which was
Plaintiffs first opportunity to be heard while represented by his new counsel on any of
the pretrial issues. On January 18, 2006, Plaintiffs new counsel filed another renewed
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demand for jury trial in ih

nu of a motion with

SUPP< >»iini: memorandum

arguing

among other things inadvertence and/or ignorance as to the paying of the fee and waiver.
Attorney Rose Blakelock filed a memorandum in opposition on or about January 24,
2006. Plaintiff filed his reply memorandum on January 30, 2006. At the time of filing the
second renewed demand, the trial date had already been set for March 27 and 28 of 2006.
Other Defendants had 10 * hy opportunity to file their own memorandum, but did not. A
final ruling denying the motion for trial by jury was entered on March 7, 2006. At a final
pretrial held - * >iur\ i

-006, the court ruled that any motion for default on the part

of Defendant Krik Myers was also denied.
Summary of Argument
Plaintiff contends that he had a prima facie case for malicious prosecution, but that
he was denied all his constitutional rights of due process in not allowing him to even
present his case and in the instance of at least one defaulting party should have received a
judgment in his favor.
Detail of Argument
Issue 1: knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, or mechanically waving trial
by jury through action of law
Plaintiff has very straight forward arguments on this issue: either the Judge erred
in determining that Plaintiff rights to trial by jury had been waived; or the Judged abused
his discretion for not even considering any evidence of how * * h\ i p«r tiewlar fee may
or may not have been collected by the Clerk of Courts upon filing a demand for Jury.

B

In this case, the trial Court would not even entertain whether a jury trial was the
proper way to resolve the case, because the Judge erroneously used only a one-part test to
determine that the jury right had already been waived despite the demand having been
made with the filing of the initial complaint.
The right to a jury trial in civil actions is guaranteed by the Constitution (U.C.A.
1953, Const. Art. 1, § 10 ). However, that right is dependent upon timely demand and is
limited to actions 'at law,' as distinguished from proceedings 'in equity.' City of Monterey
v. Del Monte Dunes, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 526 U.S. 687, 688 (U.S.Cal.1999) see also U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. 7. In Utah specifically, "A careful reading, however, of the proceedings
of the constitutional convention, Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the
Convention, 1895, Vol. I, Pages 258-62, 274-97, 492-95, discloses a virtually unanimous
intention on the part of the framers of the Constitution to preserve a constitutional right to
trial by jury in civil cases." International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor and
Implement, 626 P.2d 418 (Utah, 1981). "In general, parties bringing legal claims have a
right to a jury trial, while parties bringing equitable claims do not." Id. at 399.quoting
Goldberg v. Jay Timmons & Assocs., 896 P.2d 1241, 1242 (Utah App.1995). In actions
involving both legal and equitable issues, there is a right to jury trial on the legal issues.
Therefore, on proper motion, the court must order that the legal issues be tried separately
to preserve the right to jury trial.
Jury trial was the proper way to resolve the issues before this court. We can look
at some similar cases for example as far back as 1913; a Judge submitted a malicious
prosecution case to the Jury on the basis, " the court, in submitting the case to the jury,
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among other things, charged MUM V:

-

^ "u'7-*;* •:* iiicLLL-d lor HUM ->oth -abuse of

legal process, and the plaintiff, in order to recover, must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that a criminal process was issued against her substantially as alleged in her
complaint, and that after it was issued the defendant caused said process to be used, not
for the purpose of vindicating the criminal law, but for [another purpose]1" Kool v. Lee,
134 P. 906 (UT App I4)! <)
In Pete v. Youngblood, 141 P.3d 629 (UT 2006), there was a two part test, stating
"Pete [Plaintiff] did not make a jury demand or pa>< the ji ir> fee within ten days of service
of Youngblood's [Defendant's] answer. Pete v. Youngblood, 141 P.3d 629, 639 (UT 2006)
emphasis added. In that case it was the lack of timely demand that was the deciding
factor.
In James Mfg. Co. V. Wilson, 390 P.2d 127 (UT 1964) again the demand was the
over riding factor. "It appears that defendant did not make a demand for a jury as
provided in Rule 38, U.R.C.P." James Mfg. Co. V. Wilson, 390 P.2d 127 (UT 1964)
emphasis added.
Perhaps the best statement of the two step process was laid out clear back in
Thompson v. Anderson,l53 P.2d 665 (UT App 1944) where the coun - L "In civil
actions a jury is waived unless demanded, Utah Constitution, Article 1, Sec. 10; Sec. 104-26—1, U. C. A. 1943, and even then, unless the demand is made in the manner provided
by statute, it is unavailing. Sec. 104—23—6, U. C. A. 1943, provides: 'Either party to an
action who desires a jury trial of the same must demand it, either by written notice to the
clerk prior to the imu of sotting Midi action for trial, o> uji^ '• such reasonable time
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thereafter as the court may order."' Thompson v. Anderson,l53 P.2d 665, 668 (UT App
1944). And in Hunter v. Michaelis, 198 P.2d 245 (UT. App. 1948) when citing from
Thompson, the court again looked to the demand as the over arching procedural factor
for satisfying the "timely" portion of the Rule.
As with all of the other State Administrative services, if a fee is not paid, that
Administrative body will first give notice of the missing fee and then if and only if the
fee is not paid prior to or "at the time" the service is being provided, is the written request
deemed void for lack of the fee.1
In this case, Plaintiff did make the demand, the Clerk of Courts receiving the
complaint accepted the filing and fee payments, Counsel for Plaintiff at the time told
Defendant that he had paid the fee, and the Demand was noticed to all parties and to
opposing counsel. If somehow the Clerk got shorted some money, then who is to say
which particular fee was not paid; was it the filing fee that was shorted or was it the Jury
fee? There were no records presented to the Judge and he had no way of knowing what
the situation was on fee payments. Instead, the Judge merely obviated his dislikes for the
Pro Se Plaintiff and sought to find some reason, even if not supported by any facts, to just
disallow the Plaintiffs demand for a jury.

Compare Utah Administrative Code: The Utah Administrative Code is "evidence of the administrative
law of the state of Utah" and an "authorized compilation of the administrative law of Utah" (Section 6346a-16). Compare also Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration, "Rule 4-202.08. Fees for
records, information, and services: (1) Fees payable. Fees are payable to the court or office that provides
the record, information, or service at the time the record, information, or service is provided."
Emphasis added.
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There was no showing in this case whether the fee was paid or not. There was no
entering of evidence for the Court of fee receipts to show that the fee had not been paid.
It was only the Judge, not even opposing counsel, who offered testimony in a preliminary
hearing that he felt the fee had not been paid. It was either plain error in finding that the
Jury demand had been waived, or it was abuse of discretion by the Judge. By not taking
in. any considerations of llv circumstances whereby he could adequately consider the
sufficiency of a jury demand, where: prior counsel for appellant paid all the fees as
requested by the clerk of courts; prior counsel for appellant

l

*nned appellant thatjury

demand had been properly made; court first informed the Plaintiff/Appellant of its
contention at the very first hearing on the matter that the jury fee had not been recorded;
and the demand for jury was renewed and paid prior to scheduling for trial and 5 months
prior to the trial, the Court substantially violated the Plaintiffs Constitutional rights.
Issue 2: Whether party pro se can be granted trial by jury?
It was abuse of discretion to disallow Pro se party to represent himself. Again, the
arguments to this issue arc quite Ucur -.Kid -.miplc Parties represented b\ an aUorne\ do
not necessarily have their cases presented any better than if self-represented. As a
general statement, it is true that attorneys have had superior training, but as was evident
in this case that in the end none of the Plaintiffs attorneys exhibited superior skills.
Plaintiff may be a country boy at heart, but had spent several years in the military
where interpretation of the rules and regulations was a full time job for him. Plaintiff can
study rules and cases and draft pleadings in his own words and then seek professional
writers to correct the uranmar and s\ nta\ Plaintiff could have then even employed a

friend, legal assistant, paralegal, clerk or really any capable person (attorney or nonattorney) to merely help him while not actually representing him during the trial.
Instead, when Plaintiffs original attorney who had health problems and had moved
his practice to a different city, Plaintiff was forced to hire another attorney only because
of the Judges orders. That last minute attorney was ill prepared at the time of trial to
fully represent Plaintiffs case, as a direct result. Furthermore, Plaintiff only hired an
attorney because the Judge told him he would likely get his trial by Jury if he did hire an
attorney. Instead, the hiring of an attorney was just a further assurance that the Judge
would get the outcome the judge was after.
The Utah Court of Appeals made it clear in the Bovo case that it is never a good
practice for the Judge to be making the decisions for a party appearing before him which
are constitutionally reserved for that Part]/ to decide for themselves. Under our law,
parties are not required to make futile objections in order to preserve a future claim. See
Orem City v. Bovo, 76 P.3d 1170, ffl[13, 16 (2003 UT App 286). Thus, because the trial
court first erred by concluding that the Pro Se party was incapable of presenting his case
before a jury, we cannot say that Plaintiff waived his right to a Jury.
Issue 3: Whether one private party can sue another private party for
malicious prosecution?
This third issue is straight forward and important to this appeal, because the Trial Court
Judge refused to enter any written findings in his final order. We have to turn to the record of
the trial to see what the Trial Judge did and whether there were any findings to support what he
did with his order of dismissal.
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The fact that the Judge would not even entertain the idea u n one pr-v.-.v pam couKI sue
another private party in malicious prosecution became a matter of that trial court record. But
r ; ;.-,•:•'!"contends thai he du

.-. vc a , an v of aenon, therefore the errors at the trial court were

not harmless. It is simply plain error in the law for the Court to have: excluded so much of the
evidence on relevance grounds; holding that the evidence couldn't be relevant to the case in
controversy; and finding no cause of action in malicious prosecution when one private party
makes false police reports against another private party. Such a decision should be reviewed de
novo.
The errors began when the Judge made the bench ruling that the two day trial was going
to be only a one day trial and at least two of the Plaintiffs key witnesses was not available until
the next morning. See Official Certified Transcript, Pg. 149, In. 25, CD#05-60-402, Penny
C. Abbott, Reporter-Transcriber. The judge essentially did not want to hear any evidence
about whether the Defendants lied in their statements made to the police.
The facts in this case could not have been more clear that the Defendants had lied
to the police in their written statements. Instead of taking any of those facts into
consideration or determining whether the Defendants had lied, the Judge decided it was
better to rule on the seniatn^ - * *

u

iher a statement t*> *hi • • •'ve conh j be a false police

report at all and ruling that those statements could not be considered a police report.
For example, the opposing counsel stipulated that Deieiuianf

-Elements to the

police were "without basis and unfounded" and the Judge would not rule whether or not
those lies could constitute a "false police report." Official Certified Transcript, pg. I 12,
In 8 - pg. 119, CD#05-60-402, Penny C. Abbott, Reporter-Transcriber.
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Instead the Judge forced an imaginative interpretation of "Restatement 653"
saying that "to get to malicious prosecution you have to have charges filed and then you
have to show that the moving factor in the decision to make the prosecution was the
desire of the tort-feasor [or] alleged tort-feasor." Official Certified Transcript, Pg. 118,
In. 23 - pg. 119, In. 3, CD#05-60-402, Penny C. Abbott, Reporter-Transcriber.
The Judge's Bench rulings in the trial record suggested that making false
statements to the police cannot be a false police report, that evidence about any motive
and relationship between the Defendants was not going to be heard, and that the court
was not going to consider credibility, veracity, or even circumstances to Defendant
Mayna Fuller's relationship to Defendant Krik Myers. Defendant Mayna Fuller was
clearly pregnant that day in the court room and from other testimony it was known that
Defendant Mayna Fuller's husband Jonathan Fuller was not the father of the child. Yet,
the Judge would not allow any line of questioning concerning the unborn child or her
relationship with Defendant Krik Myers as to their motives to obtain supervised visitation
in their child custody matter.
Even if Defendants were lying in the court room about her relationship with
Defendant Krik Myers, the Judge was simply not going to hear it. The judge truly did
rule that a malicious prosecution case was reserved only for actions brought against the
police department or prosecuting attorneys.
Plaintiff wanted justice. Whether the complaint was called defamation, malicious
prosecution, or any other matter in tort, it just should not have mattered. The case was
simply that Plaintiff wanted redress for Defendants making all of their false statements to
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the police, which did eventually result in charges being brought against the Plaintiff,
which charges were ultimately dismissed.
If the Judge was not specifically going to address a case for malicious prosecution,
he could have addressed any tort by any other name, but instead it became a matter of the
Trial Court record that the Judge found that there was no redress or remedy for when the
parties in divorce and custody litigation seek to use the police for improper purposes.
Plaintiff, however, contends here that the trial court was in error to that regard.
A case for malicious prosecution is found in common law and has not been
modified by the Utah Code or Case law. Just because a particular cause of action is
uncommon, does not make it a non-existent cause of action. A plaintiff may state a cause
of action for abuse of process against a person "'who uses a legal process . . . against
another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed.1" Gilbert v. Ince,
1999 UT 65, U 17, 981 P.2d 841 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682, at 474
(1977)); see also Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, 30 Utah 2d 451, 455, 519 P.2d 888, 890
(1974); Kool v. Lee, 43 Utah 394, 403-04, 134 P. 906, 909 (1913); Keller v. Ray,
Quinney & Nebeker, 896 F.Supp. 1563, 1571 (D.Utah 1995); 1 RonaldE. Mallen &
Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 6.22 cmt. d, at 465 (4th ed. 1996) ("A cause of
action for abuse of process requires pleading and proof of two elements: (1) the use of
legal process primarily to accomplish a purpose not within the scope of the proceeding
for which it was designed; and (2) malice." (footnotes omitted)) [hereinafter Legal
Malpractice]; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682 cmt. b, at 475 (1977) ("For abuse of
process to occur there must be use of the process for an immediate purpose other than
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that for which it was designed and intended."); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers § 57 cmt. d, at 432 (rev. ed. 2000) ("A damaged party may recover for abuse of
process from one 'who uses a legal process whether criminal or civil, against another
primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed.'"
Although there were disputed facts at the trial court in the present case, the
Plaintiff and Defendants were family members on opposing sides in separate matters in
divorce, custody, and juvenile court matters concerning Plaintiffs grandchildren.
Plaintiff certainly alleged and presented evidence at the trial court to make out his prima
facie case that the police reports (statements to the police) were false.
Plaintiff also presented evidence that supported the false reports were for purposes
other than what criminal charges were meant to be used for. Plaintiff presented that the
false police reports were used to gain an advantage in the divorce and custody matter to
prevent the grandparents from being able to be involved in their grandchildren's lives,
which is certainly not a use those statutes were designed and intended.
In these types of divorce cases, it may seem common place that one party or the
other seeks to file false police reports in efforts to obtain restraining orders or other
means by which they can gain a "leg up" in the divorce proceedings, shifting the burden
of parental fitness, and basically practicing a divorce by ambush strategy. The use of
such tactics has become a rampant and common place strategy now for attorneys in the
District courts. The tactic is to accuse a spouse or the spouses family and most of the
time this accusation is made in an attempt to gain (or re-gain) control of custody
proceedings.
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When such police reports are found to be false or lacking, however, finding of a
remedy for the aggrieved parties is difficult or impossible in the family courts. The best
an aggrieved party can hope for is that the Divorce court will see through the power play
for what it is and award custody and/or visitation accordingly. Unfortunately, the redress
for the abuse of the legal processes in the family courts has been extremely limited if not
outright non-existent, allowing for this abuse to go unchecked.
Therefore Plaintiff, as the aggrieved party, brought his case for abuse of process in
the form of a malicious prosecution cause of action and sought to make his case at trial
for the abuse of the legal process and malice on the part of Defendants.
If the trial court judge found it distasteful, then perhaps a better remedy should
have been availed to the litigants in the family courts, but under current family court
practices, remedies are not available. See generally Utah Code — Title 30 « Husband and
Wife. Unless and until the State of Utah has statutorily laid out other such remedies, it
was both plain error and abuse of discretion for the Trial Court Judge to have simply
dismissed Plaintiffs abuse of process claims merely because such an action was
extremely uncommon.
Issue 4: Whether a defaulting party can effectually be found to have
rebutted a prima facie case based on a non-defaulting party?
In this case the one Defendant who was alleged to have instigated, initiated, and
solicited the false statements to the police, never properly answered and then never
showed up to court. If there was one thing absolutely clear in this case, it was that
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Defendant Krik Myers merely answered his complaint unsigned and then proceeded to
simply ignore the remainder of the process entirely.
Even to this day, both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals have no record of
the Defendant's whereabouts. He has defaulted by every meaning of the word. He has
failed to plead or otherwise defend and that fact was made abundantly clear to the Trial
Court. See U.R.C.P. R. 55.
The case in Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998)
fairly well makes out the current law in matters of Default. The Utah Supreme court
stated in its opinion:
When a defendant fails to appear and answer a complaint,
the entry of a default does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to a
default judgment for the damages claimed in the complaint. There
is an important distinction between a default and a default
judgment. Rule 55 provides for the entry of default by the clerk of
the court whenever a party "has failed to plead or otherwise defend
as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear." Utah
R. Civ. P. 55(a)(1). In other words, all that must be shown for the
entry of a default is that the defendant has failed to answer the
complaint in a timely fashion. See 10 Moore's Federal Practice §
55.11[3][a] (3d ed.1997).
A clerk of the court may enter a default judgment if a
defendant defaults and if the complaint seeks damages for a "sum
certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain."
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Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b). However, if the damages claimed are
unliquidated, a default judgment can be entered only by a judge.
See Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984). To enter
a default judgment for unliquidated damages, a judge must review
the complaint, determine whether the allegations state a valid claim
for relief, and award damages in an amount that is supported by
some valid evidence. In other words, the allegations in the
complaint are not a sufficient basis for awarding unliquidated
damages. See Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1984). That
usually means a hearing must be held so that the plaintiff can
provide evidentiary support for the award of damages.
Moreover, a default judgment is valid only if the well-pled
facts show that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. The uncontroverted allegations of the complaint must be
sufficient on their face to establish a valid claim against the
defaulting party. See American Towers Owners Assoc, v. CCI
Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1194 (Utah 1996); Cripps v. Life
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir.1992); Nishimatsu
Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th
Cir.1975). Only well-pled facts alleged in the pleadings of the
nondefaulting party are binding and can support the default
judgment. See Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th
Cir.1978). Although factual allegations are deemed admitted, a
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plaintiffs legal allegations are not binding. See Nishimatsu Constr.
Co., 515 F.2d at 1206. Accordingly, a court may grant relief only if a
valid legal basis supported by well-pled facts is asserted in the
complaint. See CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d at 1194; 10 Moore's
Federal Practice § 55.12[1] (3d ed.1997). On appeal from a default
judgment, a defendant may contest "the sufficiency of the complaint
and its allegations to support the judgment." Nishimatsu Constr.
Co.,515F.2dat1206.

Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope 8A, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998)

In the present case there were no liquidated damages and therefore default
judgment entry by the judge was available for the Plaintiff where the Defendant failed t(
properly appear or plead. The court had only the nondefaulting Plaintiff and the other
nondefaulting Defendants before him.
Issue 5: Ineffective

Counsel

Plaintiff cites authority to Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994) whc
relied on Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2
674 (1984), stating "[T]he United States Supreme Court established a two-part test for
determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of couns<
has been violated. We have adopted that test as follows: To prevail, a defendant must
show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable
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manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. Bundy v.
Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); see, e.g., State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186—
87 (Utah 1990); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d
401, 405 (Utah 1986)." Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994) citing from
Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984).
In this case Attorney # 1 failed to pay all the required fees upon filing the
complaint. Attorney # 1 also filed a complaint that was completely vague as to the cause
of action against one primary Defendant, Plaintiffs Daughter-in-law, Mayna Fuller.
Attorney # 2, then came to court ill prepared to present and argue the case, failing to
assert any damages prior to closing the case for the Plaintiff and essentially admitting that
the court had caught him "with his pants down and did not bring the damages." Official
Certified Transcript, Pg. 165, In. 11-12; and counsel's argument in general pgs. 162175, CD#05-60-402, Penny C. Abbott, Reporter-Transcriber.
Issue 6: Sufficient findings of facts and conclusions of law
"Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is reversible error
unless the facts in the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a
finding in favor of the judgment.' The findings of fact must show that the court's
judgment or decree 'follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence.' The
findings 'should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" 18 P.3d
27

1129; Bailey v. Bayles; 2001 UT App 34, quoting from Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev.
Corp. v. Pine-crest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1995) (citations
omitted).
It was Plaintiffs understanding that the Judge asked the attorney for the
Defendants, Rose Blakelock, to prepare an order to submit to Court and that she agreed to
do so. According to Rule 7 it says, " the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after
the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the
court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after
service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served
with an objection or upon expiration of the time to object.
Attorney for the Defendants must have been so overwhelmed with work to file the
order that the Trial Judge asked her to do., that it never got filed. Then when Plaintiff, Pro
se, 6 months plus later filed a proposed order, none of the parties objected. It seems that
the Judge who finally got the order and then took it upon himself to simply "scratch" out
all findings of the court, did not have proper basis to do so according to the Rules of Civil
procedure. Plaintiff requests that the portions of the order which were stricken should be
restored to the proposed language as submitted.

Concluding Statement Including Statement of Relief Sought
With the numerous errors at the Trial Court including: improperly denied jury
demand; disrespect for pro se litigants; raising the standard for an abuse of process claim
by adding elements that do not exist; allowing a defaulting party to avoid justice;
ineffective counsel; and ultimately failing to make any proper findings of fact or
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conclusions of law; this case should be reversed or at the very least remanded for jury
trial.
An abuse of process claim only requires that the Plaintiff meet two fairly simple
elements: (1) the use of legal process primarily to accomplish a purpose not within the
scope of the proceeding for which it was designed; and (2) malice. Instead of following
the law in this case, the Trial Court Judge seemingly decided (although we have no
written findings) to add more elements to the cause of action. The Judge found that
Defendants filing lffalse statements'1 with the police could not be deemed filing "false
police reports" and that the Defendants had to put some kind of "pressure" on the
prosecutor in order to meet the required elements. Official Certified Transcript, Pg. 171,
In. 10 - Pg. 172, In. 22, CD#05-60-402, Penny C. Abbott, Reporter-Transcriber.
With these numerous errors in law and abuse of discretion, justice has not been
served in this matter. Plaintiff respectfully requests reverse and/or remand.

Dated t h i s ^ / day of #**f 2007

BY: ft
David Fuller, Pro Se

Z°i
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visitation, if we were to order —

and I don't —

2

spoken, so I don't know your positions on them.

3

to order supervised visitation for Dad, unsupervised for the

4

grandparents, the paternal grandparents, as determined by the

5

guardian ad litem and the DCFS worker to work out details; is

6

that sufficient for you, Mr. Danielson?

7

MR. DANIELSON: Is that okay?

8

MR. FULLER: Yes.

9

MR. DANIELSON: That would be fine.

10
11
12
13
14

you haven't
If we were

THE COURT: Would that be acceptable to your client,
Mr. DeWitt?
MR. DeWITT: My client is not sure that unsupervised
visitation with grandparents would be appropriate.
THE COURT: Let me just ask you a question.

I

—
Is that

15

because of the grandparents' behavior and actions and history,

16

or because of Dad's involvement with the grandparents?

17

MR. DeWITT: Both, your Honor.

18

THE COURT: I don't think I saw any allegations

19

regarding grandparents.

20 I paperwork

Both.

Of course at the time she filed the

—

21

MR. DeWITT: Right, right.

22

THE COURT: Well, okay.

It appears that Mr. DeWitt

23 I would be suggesting that the appropriate visitation or parent
24

time, as we now call it, would be supervised visits determined

25

by the guardian ad litem and the DCFS worker for both the

-9
paternal grandparents as well as Dad.

Mr. Hilton?

MR. HILTON: We would strongly resist supervised
visitation for the grandparents, but I assume that's going to
require an evidentiary hearing -THE COURT: We probably don't have time to get into it
MR. HILTON: I know.

I'm just saying, which I guess

we'll have to do.
MR. DANIELSON: Your Honor, and I suppose the best
person to determine wither or not supervised visits would be
appropriate or not is the guardian ad litem.

I think he ought

to have a consultation with DCFS.
THE COURT: Typically I would give some discretion
there, but I would order visitation to be either supervised
or unsupervised.

It places him in an awkward position to try

to make the evidentiary decisions that's been referred to.
You know, as far as time and frequency, et cetera,
it works better to have someone kind of negotiating that, but
if I leave the burden on him to decide if the grandparents are
inappropriate or appropriate, he's going to be needing to take
some kind of statement.
The protective order cases in these hearings come
on so quickly that sometimes we're all here with very little
background information.
Frequently we do not.
in this case?

Sometimes we get a DCFS report.
I assume we don't have a written report

